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ommunity action in the credit market is 
usually prompted by the need to improve the 
flow of information between borrowers and 
lenders. Left to itself, the credit market rations 
borrowerswhose creditworthiness is costly to 
assess because of lack of information. More often 
than not, poor households lack collateral, are thus 
considered risky borrowers, and are denied credit. 
Hence, a case arises for community action that acts 
on behalf of the poor. 
But such community action is by no means 
automatic, at least when it comes to rescuing those 
in poverty. A key requirement of community-driven 
action is some critical level of convergence of in-
terests within the community. Credit being a private 
good, convergence of interest is harder to achieve 
than a public good, such as a community road 
project, where it is much easier to build consensus. 
Also, because the excluded are usually the poorest in 
a community, convergence of interest within this 
deprived group is often insufficient to trigger the 
needed level of community action, given that the 
poor are general powerless and have a weak voice in 
society. Poverty-oriented, group-based microfinance 
institutions primarily aim to address the above 
shortcoming: they strive to align their services to the 
needs and preferences of the poor. 
Purpose of This Study 
This case study examines the 
scaling-up experiences of two mi-
crofinance institutions: the Nirdhan 
Utthan Bank Limited (NUBL) in 
Nepal and the Self-Help Group 
(SHG)-Bank linkage program of the 
National Agricultural Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) in 
India. Both NUBL and NABARD groups use self-
regulation (peer selection, peer monitoring, and peer 
enforcement of contracts) as key to gaining access to 
services not otherwise available to them. 
NUBL is what is known as a Grameen replica-
tor, an institution that consciously replicates the 
main organizational features and practices of the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Initiated as a non-
governmental organization (NGO) and later incor-
porated as a not-for-profit development bank, NUBL 
operates in seven districts in southern Nepal. NUBL 
staff members actively identify destitute households 
in their operational area and motivate women from 
such households to form small groups. All group 
members agree to abide by a standard code of con-
duct. After some basic training, the women take 
turns borrowing small amounts of money from 
NUBL. Credit is provided without collateral and 
under group liability. All borrowers follow a 
standard repayment plan. 
The NABARD program also makes group-based 
transactions a core principle. There are, however, 
two important differences. Unlike NUBL, however, 
NABARD is not in the business of providing 
financial services directly to the SHGs. Also unlike 
NUBL, NABARD is not directly involved in the 
process of group formation and operation. Instead, it 
provides financial and technical support to existing 
NGOs and other organizations that undertake the 
task of promoting groups in their locality and link-
ing them with preexisting banks that provide the fi-
nancial services. NABARD provides a combination 
of financial incentives and technical support to the 
banks so that the banks find it worthwhile to transact 
with the groups formed. 
Findings Related to 
Scaling Up 
Both NUBL and NABARDs 
programs have groups at the 
core of their operations, but 
for both, the principal lever 
facilitating group formation 
and group action is located outside the immediate 
community of those who make up the groups them-
selves. NUBL provides well-defined banking ser-
vices and oversees the process of group formation 
and conduct. NABARD, on the other hand, only in-
directly facilitates group formation and their subse-
quent ties with banksfrom cooperatives to private 
commercial  banks.  In  the  case  of  NABARD,  the 
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dynamics of group formation and the quality of the 
groups interaction with the financial institution is 
greatly conditional on the type of NGO and bank se-
lected to service the group. However, in both cases, 
standardization of the rules of conduct and of the 
basic service delivery mechanism (in NUBLs case, 
also financial products) was key to swift replication. 
The Grameen experience in Bangladesh was 
instrumental in paving the way for the expansion of 
both programs. In Nepal, where the density of bank-
ing services provided by other financial institutions 
was low, NUBL chose to be a financial service 
provider and decided to replicate methodology of the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. In India, where the 
density of banking services was already very high, 
NABARD recognized the core advantages of group-
based finance as exemplified in the Grameen 
experience but decided to facilitate linkage banking 
instead. Simply put, the models responded to the 
different conditions in the two countries. 
The NABARD experience was also different in 
that it was government-led. NABARD itself is a 
quasi-governmental body and receives critical sup-
port from both Indias central bank and also from 
national-level policymakers. This has been a key 
factor in triggering the massive scaling-up witnessed 
in recent years. NUBL, on the other hand, was estab-
lished as an alternative to government action. How-
ever, in both cases, government policy in the form of 
mandatory priority-sector credit played-and con-
tinues to play-a critical role in facilitating expansion. 
The subsidy content of both NUBL and the 
NABARD program is quite high; further, continued 
expansion of both programs is highly conditional on 
whether the policy regime of directed credit 
continues on in the future. Any change in this policy 
will deal a severe blow to both these institutions. 
Provisioning group-based credit is costly, as it is 
facilitator-intensive. In the case of NUBL, staffing 
requirements are so high that it has so far not been 
possible to scale up services in more remote and 
sparsely populated mountainous areas. NUBL is 
currently searching for alternative models to expand 
services in these areas. In India, expansion of 
services in the more remote northeastern states has 
been hindered by the high cost of setting up and 
operating SHG-promoting institutions. One option in 
both countries is to induce the development of group 
federations that eventually become self-financing 
and self-regulating. Instances of well-functioning 
group federations are emerging in parts of India, and 
federations may well be the key to consolidating the 
gains made so far, ensuring that the programs are 
primarily driven by the interests of clients, and an 
eventual ending of subsidies. 
Conclusions 
These case studies show the importance of the 
broader national environment in facilitating the 
growth of institutions. NUBLs growth leveled off 
just as the expansion of SHGs accelerated in India. 
This was not a coincidence: the Maoist insurgency in 
Nepal severely restricted the development of the 
microfinance sector, while an enabling environment 
in India facilitated its unparalleled expansion. 
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